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     We show that, in cooperative production games, when the production functions are not concave, the core 
may well be empty. However, as the number of players increases (subject to some regularity conditions) the 
relative deficit obtained by using concavified functions decreases to zero. Furthermore, differentiability of the 
functions will cause the absolute deficit to go to zero.  
 
0. Description of the Problem 
 
In [Aumann and Shapley 1974], hereafter referred to as A/S, the question of the relation between the core and 
the Shapley value of very large games is studied in detail. The following (non-atomic) production model is 
given: 
 
1.  The set of players is isomorphic to the unit interval I = [0, 1], 
2.  Permissible coalitions form a σ-algebra, ϑ, isomorphic to the σ-algebra of Borel sets, 
3.  Each player s∈I is assigned an endowment, a(s), a vector in Euclidean space ℜm+  (where m is independent 
of s), 
4.  Each player s is given a personal technology, represented by a production function u(x, s), defined for 
x∈ℜm+, 
5.  Members of a coalition can pool their resources so as to maximize total production. 
 
     Thus, the characteristic function, for B∈ϑ, is given by 
 
v(B)  =  sup  [∫B u(x(s), s) µ(ds) | ∫B x(s) µ(ds)  = ∫B a(s) µ(ds) ] . 
 
     A/S gives certain regularity conditions for this model. These include, essentially, monotonicity and 
continuous differentiability of the production functions u(•, s), slow growth of these same functions, and strict 
positivity of the endowments a(s). 
     Under these reasonable conditions, A/S then proves that, for these games, the core (a) is non-empty and (b) 
consists of a single point, which (c) coincides with the non-atomic (Shapley) value. Moreover, (d) this value is 
based on a vector of equilibrium prices for the m goods in an endowment, prices that (e) can be obtained by an 
integration technique (the so-called diagonal method). 
 
     These results are valid for non-atomic market games. Since, however, non-atomic markets do not exist, the 
problem is to determine the extent to which these results are valid for the large market games which the non-
atomic games approximate. Specifically, we would like to know what type of convergence we have here: in 
which way are the finite games assumed to grow? In what sense are these non-atomic results the limits of 
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properties of the finite games? To what extent do these results depend on the regularity conditions given by 
A/S? 
 
     In this article we propose to discuss the non-emptiness of the core. Specifically, we show that under similar 
conditions (to those of A/S), the core of the finite games might well be empty. However, points based on a 
Lagrangian price vector will be almost in the core, in the sense that, for each coalition S, the excess will be not 
greater than some (relatively) small positive number.  
 
     The first thing we note is that the A/S theorem does not assume the production functions ui are concave.  
Now, if they were concave, there would be no problem. (We shall see more about this case below.) With non-
concave functions, the core for a finite game might well be empty. The following example, from 
(Shapley/Shubik 1966), shows this: 
 
Example 1. As a trivial example of how the core may be empty, consider a game with only one resource (i. e., m 
= 1). Each of n players has an endowment a = ½. Each unit of the resource can be sold for $1; we equate utility 
with money. However, only full units can be sold; fractions left over have no value, so that 
 
ui(x)  = [x] 
 
(where [x] is the greatest integer function) for each player i. The resulting game has the very simple 
characteristic function 
v(S)  =  [s/2] 
 
where s is the cardinality of coalition S.  
     [We might interpret this as follows: the resource is wine; each player has ½ liter, in a plastic jug. Each 
player’s “technology” consists of some liter bottles and a funnel, which allow him to “transform” the resource 
(wine in a plastic jug) into the market good (bottled wine), which can be sold at an exogenous price of $1 per 
bottle. There is a very rigorous state liquor authority which makes certain that consumers get their money’s 
worth, so that it is impossible to sell bottles containing less than a full liter. Moreover, if the bottle contains more 
than a full liter, it can still be sold only for $1.]  
     Now, if the number of players, n, is even, say n = 2k, the situation is quite simple. The resource has an 
equilibrium price of $1 per unit, and k of the players will sell their half unit to the other k players for 50¢. Now 
these latter sell their bottled wine on the open market for $1, thus netting 50¢ each. The resulting imputation (½, 
½, …, ½) is clearly in the core of the game.  
     It is not difficult to see, however, that whenever n (the number of players) is odd (and at least 3), the core of 
the game must be empty. For, if n = 2k+1, then v(N) = k. The core conditions, however, require that each 2-
player set receive at least $1, and this can only be achieved if there are n/2 = k+½ dollars available. Thus there is 
a deficit (we define this concept more rigorously below) of 50¢, and the core is empty. Note however that, as the 
number of players increases, the relative deficit, which can be (more or less) defined as ½ divided by v(N), and 
is thus approximately 1/n, goes to 0. In this sense, and in this sense only, we can say that in the limit there is a 
non-empty core.  
     (It may, of course, be objected that the production functions ui(x) are neither continuous nor slow-growth. 
However, the same results can be obtained with the slightly different function 
 
ui(x)  =  min {[x], 1} 
 
which is certainly a slow-growth function. As to continuity and differentiability, it is easy to make small 
modifications in this function so as to obtain differentiability while preserving its essential character, which is 
that u(0) = 0, u(1) = 1,  and u(x) < x for all other x. The core will then be empty for similar reasons.) 
 
     We proceed, then, to analyze the non-emptiness of the core.  In our analysis, the following definition will 
play an important role:  
     Definition 1. Let (v, N) be an n-person TU game in characteristic function form. Let µ(v, N) be the value of 
the program 
 
µ  =  minimum  ∑i∈N  zi 
 
subject to     ∑i∈S zi  ≥  v(S)   for all S⊂N 
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Then the (absolute) deficit of (v, N) is  
def(v, N)  =  µ – v(N). 
 
It is not difficult to see that def(v) is always non-negative. Moreover, the core of v is non-empty if and only if 
def(v) = 0. A small positive deficit will be taken to mean that the core is “nearly non-empty.” Since, however, 
quantities are small only by comparison, we also use the following definition: 
 
     Definition 2. Let (v, N) be an n-person non-negative super-additive TU game. The relative deficit is  
 
rdf(v, N)  =  def(v, N) / v(N). 
 
Remark: Other researchers talk instead about the weak and strong ε-cores. Briefly, if def  ≤  ε, then the strong ε-
core is non-empty. Non-emptiness of the weak ε-core is more difficult to characterize, but it c orresponds (more 
or less) to def ≤ εn (where n is the number of players). 
 
1. The non-differentiable case 
 
a. The Mathematical Model 
 
     Analogously to A/S, we consider an n-person game (N, v) in characteristic function form, given by 
 
(1.1)                                                                v(S)  =   Max ∑i∈S ui(xi) 
 
Subject to    ∑i∈S xi  =  ∑i∈S ai 
 
xi  ≥  0 
 
where each ai (the endowment) is a vector in ℜm+ and each ui (the production function) is a mapping from ℜm+ 
into the reals.  
     We define an allocation as an n-tuple X = [x1, …, xn] of non-negative m-vectors. It is feasible if  
 
∑i∈N xi  =  ∑i∈N ai 
 
      Each of the vectors xi = (xi1, xi2, …, xim) in an allocation is an allotment. 
 
      The function v can be obtained by solving 2n-1 maximization problems – one for each non-empty S⊂N. 
Obviously, even for mid-sized n, this is a tremendous amount of work. Nevertheless we can try to determine 
whether the core is empty. In fact, we shall prove below Theorem 4, which states, more or less, that: 
 
Theorem:  under certain reasonable conditions to be given below, the relative deficit of the game goes to 0 
as the number of players goes to infinity. 
 
     We will assume a finite but growing number of players; i.e., new players will be brought into the game. 
These new players cannot be arbitrary, in the sense that their production functions ui and endowments ai must 
satisfy certain regularity conditions. We shall discuss later the conditions on these new players. For the moment, 
we assume a fixed game with n players and m resources. As in A/S, we assume all the production functions ui(x) 
are monotone increasing, with ui(0) = 0. (We do not assume differentiability in this section.) We will, moreover, 
make the following assumption 1: 
 
     For each i, there is a convex, compact polyhedral set Qi which has the property that, in all the maximization 
problems (1), the maximizing allotment xi can always be found in the set Qi. 
 
     [Remark: This restriction on the functions ui corresponds, more or less, to the “slow-growth” property given 
in A/S. Essentially, it says that there is no producer who is so efficient that – as new players come into the game 
– this one producer keeps on using more and more of the resources. The reason for this assumption is not quite 
obvious here, but it will help, below, in dealing with concavifications. ] 
 
 4
    We will be particularly interested in the optimization problem corresponding to v(N), which we call Program 
A: 
 
(1.A1)                                                               Maximize  ∑i∈N ui(xi) 
 
                            Subject to        
(1.A2)                                                                 ∑i∈N xi  =  ∑i∈N ai 
           
(1.A3)                                                                          xi ∈ Qi 
          
(1.A4)                                                                          xi  ≥  0. 
 
     Note that with assumption 1, the constraint (A3) is not binding, in the sense that the solution obtained without 
regard to it will automatically satisfy (A3). 
 
b. Concave functions and concavifications 
 
      Suppose, first, that the functions ui are concave. In that case, the objective function (A1), as the sum of 
concave functions, is concave. The constraint set is a convex polyhedron. Thus this is of the class of 
optimization problems considered “easy.” As is well known (see, e.g., [Rockafellar 1970]), the solution can be 
expressed in terms of Lagrange multipliers: there exists a vector of equilibrium prices  
 
p  =  (p1, p2, …, pm) 
 
with the property that the maximum of program A is obtained by assigning to each player, i, an allotment xio 
which maximizes the function 
 
(1.3)                                                             gi(xi; p)  =  ui(xi) –  ∑jpjxij 
 
The corresponding allocation Xo = [x1o , …, xno ] gives the desired maximum. Moreover, the imputation q = (q1, 
…, qn) given by  
 
(1.4)                                                             qi  =  ui(xio ) –  ∑j pj xijo  +  ∑j pj aij 
 
will be in the core of the game. 
 
     [We interpret this as follows: the function gi represents the profits that player i’s technology can afford him. 
In equilibrium, each player maximizes his profits, given the prices pj, and is moreover paid for his original 
endowment at these prices.] 
 
     Suppose, however, that the functions ui are not concave. For each i, let ûi be the concavification of ui, i. e., the 
smallest concave function which is not smaller than ui on all of its domain. We will obtain a new game, v’, 
defined by 
 
(1.5)                                                                 v’(S)  =   Max ∑i∈S ûi(xi) 
 
Subject to    ∑i∈S xi  =  ∑i∈S ai 
 
xi ∈ Qi 
 
xi  ≥  0 
 
Remark 1. Clearly, v’(S) ≥ v(S) for all S; hence, µ(v’, N) ≥ µ(v, N). But since v’ is obtained from concave 
functions, it will have a non-empty core, so v’(N) = µ(v’, N). Thus v’(N) ≥ µ(v, N), and we find that this 
represents a “goal to shoot for:” if (in game v) some feasible allocation gives a total payoff of v’(N)-ε, then 
def(v, N) is not more than ε. 
 
     The two following definitions will prove useful: 
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 Definition. We shall say that an allotment x is a true point of the concavification ûi if ûi(x) = ui(x). It is a virtual 
point if ûi(x) > ui(x). 
 
Definition. The quantity 
γi  =  max { ûi(x) – ui(x) | x ∈ Qi } 
 
is the duality gap for ui. Since these functions are continuous, and Qi is compact, this maximum exists, and is 
finite, for all i. Let γ* be the largest of all the γi. 
 
     The following two theorems, dealing with concavified functions, are important in our development. They are 
standard theorems of convex analysis. 
 
Theorem 1 (Caratheodory and Krein/Milman). Let u be a continuous function defined over a compact convex 
subset Q of ℜm+, and let û be its concavification. Let xo be a virtual point of û. Then there exists a set of β 
(where β ≤ m+1) true points yh and β real numbers rh  (h = 1, 2, …, β) such that   
 
xo  =  ∑h rh yh 
∑h rh  =  1 
rh  >  0 
 
and 
   û(x)  =  ∑h rh u(yh) 
 
 
Theorem 2. Let yh (h = 1, 2, …, β) be the β points determined by the virtual point xo in accordance with 




 z  =  ∑h sh yh 
∑h sh  =  1 
sh  ≥  0. 
Then  
 
û(z)  =  ∑h sh u(yh). 
 
Remark 2: Note that in Theorem 1, the numbers rh are positive; in Theorem 2, the numbers sh are merely 
assumed non-negative. 
 
c. Three modified optimization problems 
 
     We now consider the modified (i.e., concavified) optimization problem, which we call Program B:  
 
(1.B1)                                                               Maximize  ∑i∈N ûi(xi) 
 
                            Subject to        
(1.B2)                                                                 ∑i∈N xi  =  ∑i∈N ai 
           
(1.B3)                                                                          xi ∈ Qi 
          
(1.B4)                                                                          xi  ≥  0 
 
 
     We note, first of all, that Programs A and B, having the same constraint sets, differ only in their objective 
functions.  Thus the solution of each is a feasible point for the other. Let, then X* = [x1*, …, xn*] be the solution 
(maximizing allocation) for Program A, and let Xo = [x1o, …, xno] be that for Program B. Then 
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(1.6)                         ∑i∈N ui(xio )  ≤  ∑i∈N ui(xi* )  ≤  ∑i∈N ûi(xi* )  ≤   ∑i∈N ûi(xio )  =  v’(N) 
 
and it follows that  
 
(1.7)                                                      def(v, N)  ≤  ∑i∈N {ûi(xio ) – ui(xio )}. 
 
Thus, if all the allotments xio were true points of the corresponding functions, the deficit would be zero; i.e., the 
core would be non-empty. In fact we can’t count on such good luck; we must therefore take a closer look at 
those allotments that are virtual points. 
     Suppose xio is, in fact, a virtual point of the function ûi. Then there exist βi true points yih (h = 1, 2, …, βi) 
related to xio as explained in Theorem 1. In case xio is a true point of ûi,, we set βi = 1 and there is a single point, 
yi1 = xio, corresponding to this theorem. Note that, in any case, all yih ∈ Qi. These points yih will be fixed from 
now on (until the end of this section). 
 
     Consider, now, Program C: 
 
(1.C1)                                                               Maximize  ∑i∈N ûi(zi) 
 
                            Subject to        
(1.C2)                                                                 ∑i∈N zi  =  ∑i∈N ai 
           
(1.C3)                                              for each i,       zi  =  ∑h sih yih 
 
(1.C4)                                             for each i,         ∑h sih  =  1 
 
(1.C5)                                                                         sih  ≥  0. 
      
 
     Note the difference between Program B and Program C. In C, the allotments are restricted to convex linear 
combinations of the corresponding yih. On the other hand, the B3 and B4 have been removed. Since, however, 
all the points yih ∈ Qi , constraints C3, C4 and C5 imply B3 and B4. Thus the constraint set for C is a subset of 
that for B, and so the maximum of C cannot be greater than that for B. On the other hand, the maximizing 
allocation for B satisfies the constraints of C, and must thus be the X-part of a solution for C. Conversely, since 
this means that the maximum is the same for both programs, it will follow that the X-part of any solution for C is 
also a solution for B. 
      We now apply Theorem 2: for any zi satisfying C3 and C4, the relation  
 
ûi(zi)  =  ∑h ui(yih ) sih 
must hold. 
 
       Consider then Program D: 
 
(1.D1)                                                   Maximize  ∑i ∑h ui(yih ) sih  
 
                            Subject to        
(1.D2)                                                           ∑i ∑h yih sih =  ∑i∈N ai 
  
(1.D3)                                             for each i,         ∑h sih  =  1 
 
(1.D4)                                                                         sih  ≥  0. 
 
     As may be seen, Program D is merely Program C with the explicit presence of the allotments zi removed. 
Thus the solution for Program D is merely the s-part of a solution for C. From this solution (for D), moreover, a 
solution for B will be obtained by use of the relations C3. Thus, we may in fact assume that Program B has a 
solution of this type. 
     Note, moreover, that, since the yih are fixed, Program D is in fact a linear program. Thus, a solution (siho) can 
always be found at an extreme point of the constraint set.  Now, at an extreme point of a linear program, the 
number of non-zero variables is not more than the number of constraints (not counting non-negativity 
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constraints). As can be seen, D2 represents m constraints, while D3 represents n constraints. Thus there is a 
solution with not more than m+n non-zero variables siho. We will assume that the allocation Xo = [xio] is then 
given by 
 
(1.8)                                                                 xio =  ∑h siho yih 
 
     Note next that, for each of the n values of i, there must (by D3) be at least one value of h such that siho > 0. 
Hence, at the extreme-point solution, there will be at most m values of i for which two or more siho are positive. 
For the remaining n-m (or more) values of i, only one siho is positive. But then this particular siho = 1, and so xio  
= yih. In other words, at least n-m of the allotments xio are true points of the concavifications. Thus, in inequality 
(1.7), which was given above and is repeated here: 
 
(1.7)                                                 def(v, N)  ≤  ∑i∈N {ûi(xio ) – ui(xio )}, 
 
the right-hand side contains at most m non-zero terms. Now, none of these terms can be greater than γ*, and so 
we find that we have proved  
 
Theorem 3. Under the assumptions above, in a game with m resources and any number of players, and a 
maximal duality gap γ* for the production functions ui, 
 
(1.9) def(v, N)  ≤  mγ*. 
 
Remark 4. In [Aubin and Ekeland 1976] a similar result is obtained by the use of the Shapley/Folkman theorem, 
which states, more or less, that a sum of points from the convex hulls of m-dimensional sets can always be re-
expressed so that all but m+1 of the points come from the sets themselves as opposed to the convex hulls. We 
have given a slightly different proof, not because mγ* < (m+1)γ* (which though true is a trivial improvement), 
but because the intermediate result (Theorem 1 above) will be used in proving Theorem 5 below (in the next 
section). 
 
d. Assumptions on new players. We will now assume that new players are brought into the game, subject to 
the following conditions.  
Assumption 2. There is a constant γ* such that, for all players i brought into the game, the duality gap γi  ≤ γ*. 
Assumption 3. As n → ∞, so also v(N) → ∞. 
 
     Note that we do not require “replication of a profile” as in Shapley/Shubik (1966). We merely assume new 
players are not terribly different (neither much “larger” nor much “smaller”) from old players. 
 
     With these two assumptions, we can now give a final theorem: 
 
Theorem 4. Under assumptions 1 and 2, the relative deficit goes to 0 as n → ∞. 
Proof: By theorem 3, the (absolute) deficit is not greater than mγ*. Therefore 
 
rdf(v, N)  ≤  mγ* / v(N). 
 
      By Assumption 2, the numerator mγ* is constant. By Assumption 3, the denominator v(N) grows without 
bound. Thus rdf → 0. In this sense, we can say that the core is relatively non-empty in the limit.  
 
      Note: Essentially, this says that the weak ε-core is non-empty. 
 
2. The Differentiable case 
 
a. The modified counterexample 
 
      In discussing Example 1 (Section 1, above) it was pointed out that, even if the production functions ui are 
modified to be differentiable, the core of the game will be non-empty for odd values of n. In fact, while this is 
true, it turns out that differentiablity makes a substantial difference. Consider the following modification of 
Example 1:  
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Example 2. Each of n players has an endowment a = ½ unit of the good. All players have the same production 
function, u(x). We will assume that u(0) = 0, u(1) = 1, and that u(x) < x for all other x. In this example, however, 
the function u is assumed differentiable. Since u(x) – x assumes its maximum value (which is zero) at x = 1, it 
will follow that the derivative u’(1) = 1.  
      It is easily checked that, for this game, µ(v, N) = n/2 (so long as n ≥ 2). 
     As in Example 1, there will be no difficulty if n (the number of players) is even, say n = 2k. In fact, in that 
case, k of the players will sell their endowment to the other k at the equilibrium price of $1 per unit. The buyers 
will then produce goods worth k dollars in all, so that each player will receive 50¢. This payoff vector will be in 
the core. 
     Suppose, as before, that n = 2k+1. In that case, the equilibrium price still has to be $1 per unit of resource, 
and µ = k+½. However, it is impossible to obtain a total of k+½ dollars, since production can only reach this 
efficient level when each producer uses either 0 or 1 units of resource. Thus the core is necessarily empty. 
     Consider, however, the following scenario. Suppose k of the players sell their endowment to another k. This 
will give us the allocation X: 
 
xi  =  1        for i = 1, 2, …., k 
xi   =  0      for i = k+1, …, 2k 
x2k+1  =  ½                . 
 
      The total production, ∑u(xi), will then be k+ u(½). Now, since µ = k + ½ dollars, there is a deficit of  
 
def  =  ½ – u(½) 
 
dollars. Since all we know about the function u is that it is monotone and differentiable, this deficit could be as 
much as 50¢. Thus the situation here is much as in the previous counterexample. 
     The allocation X is not, however, the best that can be done. In fact, we shall see that, as n grows without 
bound, a different allocation will yield arbitrarily small deficits.  
 
     Since u’(1) = 1, it will follow that 
 
(2.1)                                                                u(1+t)  =  1 + t – e(t) 
 
where the error term, e(t), satisfies 
 
(2.2)                                                                  limt→0 e(t)/t  =  0. 
 
Given an arbitrary ε > 0, then, choose δ > 0 small enough that |e(t)/t| < ε whenever |t| < δ.  
     Let now n = 2k+1, where 1/(2k) < δ, and consider the allocation Y: 
      
yi  =  1+ 1/(2k)          for i = 1, 2, …., k 
yi   =  0        for i = k+1, …, 2k, 2k+1 
 
Thus, the ½ unit held by the inefficient producer (player 2k+1 in allocation x) is divided equally among the k 
efficient producers. Total production will then be 
 
∑u(yi)  =  k u(1 + 1/(2k)). 
Now, we have, by (1), 
 
u(1+ 1/(2k))  =  1 + 1/(2k) – e(1/(2k)) 
and so  
 
∑u(yi)  =  k + ½ – ke(1/(2k)). 
Since 1/ 2k < δ, we have 
 
ke(1/(2k))  ≤  2ke(1/(2k)) =  e(1/(2k)) / (1/(2k)) <  ε, 
and it follows that 
 
∑u(yi)  >  k + ½  – ε. 
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     Thus, with large enough n and allocation Y, the absolute deficit (not just the relative deficit) can be made 
smaller than any preassigned ε > 0.  
 
     In discussing the example above, the role played by differentiability is obvious, since in the non-
differentiable case the absolute deficit does not decrease. Not so obvious, but also important, is the fact that all 
players have the same production function u. Specifically, it is the fact that the value of δ necessary for the 
condition 
 
|e(δ)/δ| < ε 
 
to hold is the same for all players. If the players have different production functions, then it is possible that, for 
some ε, the necessary δ might decrease rapidly for newly included players. In that case, the argument used in 
this example would not hold. 
 
b. The new model 
 
     Let us, therefore, consider the same maximization problem (A) that was discussed in Section 1, above. We 
will make the additional assumption that all the functions ui are continuously differentiable and that, 
moreover, they are effectively bounded: there exists K such that allotments x with norm || x || > K are never 
efficient. Let Q be the subset of ℜm+ consisting of all non-negative x such that ||x|| ≤ 2K. 
 
     In this case we prove below Theorem 5, which states, more or less: 
 
Theorem: Under certain reasonable conditions (to be discussed below), the absolute deficit goes to 0 as the 
number of players goes to infinity. 
      
     As in Section 1, we will proceed to solve the modified (concavified) problem (B).  As discussed above, the 
solution of the modified problem (B) can be characterized in terms of terms of dual variables, i.e., an 
equilibrium price vector p = (p1,  p2, …, pm). We assume this price vector p has been found.  
 
     Now, in the maximizing allocation, each allotment xi maximizes the profit function 
      
(2.3)                                                                    gi(xi)  =   ûi(xi)  -  ∑ pjxij 
 
Let the maximizing allocation be Xo = [xio], and let M be the value of this program: 
 
(2.4)                                                                        M  =  ∑i∈N ûi(xio ) 
 
     (This is the same quantity we had called v’(N) in Section 1 above.) Once again, this M represents a “goal to 
shoot for” in the sense that, if we can obtain this amount of utility, then the imputation (q1, …, qn), where 
 
(2.5)                                                             qi  =  ûi(xio) +  ∑j pj (aij – xijo) 
 
(the sum of whose components is M) will be in the core of the game. The problem, then, lies in the fact that – 
since some of the vectors xio might be virtual rather than true points – this M is not always available; there is a 
deficit which might be as much as ∑{ûi(xio) – ui(xio)}. 
 
 
     Since the functions ui are continuously differentiable, all the partial derivatives uij = ∂ui/∂xj are uniformly 
continuous over the compact set Q. Since there is only a finite number of these derivatives, they are uniformly 
equi-continuous; i.e., given any ε > 0, there exists δ > 0 such that, if ||x–y|| < δ (and both x and y∈Q) then, for all 
i and j, |uij(x)–uij(y)| < ε.  
 
   Consider the maximizing allocation Xo = [xio]. From Section 1, we know that we can assume that at most m of 
the vectors xio are virtual points of the corresponding ûi; the remaining n–m (or more) must all be true points. 
Moreover, by Theorem 1, each of these virtual points xio can be expressed as a convex linear combination of 
(not more than) m+1 true points yih: 
 
 10
(2.10)                                                                  xio  =  ∑h rih yih 
 
∑h rih  =  1 
 
rih  >  0 
 
where, for each i, 
   ûi(xio)  =  ∑h rih ui(yih). 
 
     Now,  
gi(xio)  =   ûi(xio)  –  ∑j pjxijo 
 
gi(xio)  =   ∑h rih ûi(yih) –  ∑j pj ∑h rih yijh 
 
gi(xio)  =   ∑h rih  {ûi(yih) – ∑j pj  yijh} 
 
(2.11)                                                                gi(xio)  =  ∑h rih gi(yih) . 
 
     Since ∑h rih = 1, and all rih > 0, gi(xio) cannot be greater than the largest of the gi(yih). But in fact we know that 
xio maximizes the function gi. Thus at least one of the yih also maximizes gi. (In fact, all of the yih maximize this 
function, though that requires a slightly more subtle argument.) In any case, we see that there is, for each i, at 
least one true y that maximizes the function gi. We will therefore consider the allocation Yo = [yio], where 
 
(2.12)                                                yio  =  xio    if xio is a true point of ûi 
 
yio is a true point of ûi  that maximizes gi, otherwise 
 
     Since all the vectors yio maximize the corresponding functions gi, the allocation Yo is almost a solution to the 
concavified program. Since they are all true points, moreover, they almost give a solution, with deficit zero, to 
the original program (A). Unfortunately, this might not be a feasible allocation since, in general, the sum of the 
allotments will not be equal to the sum of the endowments.  
     We know, since Xo is the solution to problem (B), that 
 
∑i∈N xio  =  ∑i∈N ai  
Thus the “unallocated amount,” 
 
(2.13)                                                            w  =  ∑i∈N ai  – ∑i∈N yio     
 
is also given by 
 
(2.14)                                                               w  =  ∑i∈N (xio – yio). 
 
      
     Note that, in this last expression, the sum on the right-hand side contains at most m non-zero terms: those for 
which xio is a virtual point of ûi. Now, all the vectors xio and yio have norm K or smaller. Thus  
 
(2.15)                                                                      ||w||  ≤  2mK. 
 
Note also that, since all components of all these vectors are non-negative, and smaller than or equal to K, then, 
for each j, 
 
(2.16)                                                                      |wj|  ≤  mK. 
       
It will be necessary to distribute this w among the n players of the game. What we will prove is that this can be 
done in a way that gives “almost” the desired total utility M. 
 
     We mentioned above that both xio and yio maximize the function gi. It follows that gi(xio) = gi(yio). Using this, 
and the fact that the yio are true points, so that ui(yio)  =  ûi(yio), we find that 
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   ui(yio) – ∑j pjyijo   =   ûi(xio) – ∑j pjxijo 
 
and so  
 
(2.17)                                                           ui(yio)  =   ûi(xio)  –  ∑j pj (xijo – yijo). 
 
     Adding over all i,  
 
∑i ui(yio)  =  ∑i ûi(xio)  –  ∑i ∑j pj (xijo – yijo). 
 
Interchanging the order of summation, and using the definitions (4) of M and (14) of w, this reduces to 
 
(2.18)                                                                     ∑i ui(yio)  =  M – ∑j pj wj. 
 
Thus, we have a deficit not greater than the amount ∑j pj wj. 
 
c. Behavior as n Increases 
     We will now assume that the number of players, n, increases without bound. This cannot, however, be done 
arbitrarily: we must put certain conditions on the production functions ui as well as on the endowments ai of the 
new players. Essentially, we assume that the “new” players are not very different from the “old” players. (Note: 
these are essentially conditions on what [Wooders, 1992] calls the pre-game.) Thus 
 
Assumption 4. There is a constant K large enough that, as new players enter the game, allotments xi of norm 
greater than K are never efficient. (This K can be assumed greater than 1.) 
 
Assumption 5. As n → ∞, the sum ∑i∈N  aij → ∞ for all j. 
 
Assumption 6. Letting Q be the compact set in ℜm consisting of non-negative vectors of norm not greater than 
2K, all partial derivatives uij are uniformly equi-continuous in Q. 
 
 We can now state the principal result of this section: 
 
Theorem 5. Let ε > 0. Suppose assumptions 4, 5 and 6, above, hold. Then, for sufficiently large n, there is a 
feasible allocation Y’ = [yi’] such that  
 
∑i ui(yi’)   >  M – ε 
 
Proof.  
     Since the proof is somewhat long, we divide it into four parts: 
(i) We define an n-tuple Y’. 
(ii) Y’ is an allocation. 
(iii) Y’ is feasible. 
(iv) Y’ gives a deficit smaller than ε. 
 
 
 (i) We define an n-tuple Y’. 
     By Assumption 6, there exists δ > 0 such that, if ||x–y|| < δ (and both x and y∈Q) then, for all i and j, 
 
(2.19)                                                                  |uij(x) – uij(y)| < ε/m2K. 
 
This δ can be assumed smaller than 1. 
 
      By Assumption 5, we can now choose n sufficiently large that, for each j,   
 
(2.20)                                                                       ∑i∈N  aij  >  2mK2 /δ. 
 
    Let Yo = [yio] be as given above.  Now, for each i and j, let 
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(2.22)                                                                  yij’  =  yijo  +  _yijo wj_ 
                                                                                                 ∑k  ykjo    
 
 
(ii) We show that the Y’ =  [yi’] defined in this way is an allocation; i.e., all components are non-negative.  
 
     We know, by (16), (and Assumption 4) that |wj| < mK. Now, by (13),  
 
∑k  ykjo   =  ∑i aij  – wj 
 
 |∑k  ykjo|  ≥   ∑i aij  –  |wj| 
Thus, since all ykjo ≥ 0 
 
(2.23)                                                      ∑k  ykjo  >  2mK2 /δ – mK, 
 
     Since K > 1, and δ < 1, this means ∑k  ykjo  >  0. Thus the yij’ are well defined by (21) (i.e., there is no division 
by zero there). 
     Also from (13), we see that  
 




(2.24)                                                   1 + wj / ∑k  ykjo  =  ∑i aij  / ∑k  ykjo  >  0 
 
     Since yijo ≥ 0, it follows that  
 
(2.25)                                                        yij’  =  yijo {1 + wj / ∑k  ykjo }  ≥  0. 
 
(iii) We show that Y’ is feasible: the sum of the allotments is equal to the sum of the endowments. 
 
     For each j, from (21), 
∑i yij’  =   ∑i yijo  {1 + wj / ∑k  ykjo } 
 
∑i yij’ =   ∑i yijo   +  wj  
 
     Thus, from (13), 
 
∑i yij’ =  ∑i aij. 
and so 
 
(2.26)                                                                      ∑i yi’  =  ∑i ai   
 
We see then that Y’ is a feasible allocation. 
 
(iv) We show that Y’ gives a deficit smaller than ε. 
 
     Since the functions ui are differentiable,  
 
(2.27)                                                        ui(yi’)  =  ui(yio)  +  ∑j(yij’– yijo) uij(t) 
 
where the partial derivatives uij are evaluated at an intermediate point t, somewhere between yio and yi’. Now, 
for each j,  
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(2.28)                                                                 yij’ –  yijo   =  _yijo wj_ 
                                                                                                 ∑k  ykjo   
  
     We saw above (23) that 
 ∑k  ykjo  >  2mK2 /δ – mK. 
 
     Since K > 1 and δ < 1, we see that mK < mK2/δ, and it follows that  
 
(2.29)                                                                ∑k  ykjo  >  mK2/δ. 
 
Since |wj| < mK, we see that 
|yij’– yijo|  <  δ yijo / K. 
Thus, 
 
(2.30)                                                             ||yi’-yio||  <  δ||yio|| / K. 
 
     We know, however, that ||yio|| ≤ K, so ||yi’– yio|| < δ, and since t is an intermediate point, ||t – yio|| < δ. Since δ 
< K, we see also that ||t|| < 2K, and so t∈Q. 
      To simplify notation from this point on, let 
 
(2.31)                                                                   ∆ij  =  yij’ –  yijo   
 
so that (27) takes the somewhat simpler form 
 
(2.32)                                                        ui(yi’)  =  ui(yio)  +  ∑j ∆ij uij(t) 
 
Now, by (19), we see that, for each i and j, 
 
|uij(t) – uij(yio)| < ε/m2K. 
 
Hence 
|∆ij uij(t) – ∆ij uij(yio)| < ε|∆ij| / m2K 
so that 
 
(2.33)                                                  ∆ij uij(t)  >  ∆ij uij(yio) – ε|∆ij| / m2K. 
 
Summing with respect to i, we see that, for each j, 
 
(2.34)                                              ∑i ∆ij uij(t)  >  ∑i ∆ij uij(yio) – ε∑i |∆ij| / m2K. 
 
Note, however, that, by (28), for any one value of j, all non-zero ∆ij have the same sign. Thus 
 
∑i |∆ij|  =  |∑i ∆ij|  =  |wj|  <  mK 
and so (34) becomes 
 
(2.35)                                                     ∑i ∆ij uij(t)  >  ∑i ∆ij uij(yio) – ε/m. 
 
Since each yio maximizes the function gi, it follows that, for each i and j such that yijo > 0,  
 
uij(yio)  =  pj. 
 
But, by (28), ∆ij = 0 whenever yijo = 0, and so 
 
∑i ∆ij uij(yio)  =  ∑i ∆ij pj 
so that (35) takes the form 
 
(2.36)                                                             ∑i ∆ij uij(t)  >  ∑i ∆ij pj – ε/m. 
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Summing now with respect to j, 
 
∑j ∑i ∆ij uij(t)  >  ∑j {∑i ∆ij pj – ε/m}. 
 
Interchanging the order of summation, and using the fact that there are only m values of j in this sum, 
 
∑i ∑j ∆ij uij(t)  >  ∑j pj {∑i ∆ij}– ε. 
 
     Now, from (32),  
 
∑i ui(yi’)  =   ∑i {ui(yio)+∑j ∆ij uij(t)}  >  ∑i ui(yio) + ∑j pj wj – ε. 
 
But this, together with (18), gives us 
 
(2.37)                                                               ∑i ui(yi’)  >  M – ε 
 
as desired. 
     Thus we see that, as n →∞, the deficit will be smaller than any arbitrary positive ε. In this sense, we can say 
that the core is absolutely non-empty in the limit. 
 
d. Interpretation of the regularity assumptions 
 
     The regularity assumptions mentioned above may seem somewhat strange at first. However, they are in the 
spirit of not allowing any of the players to be “much larger” than the others. (In other articles, the assumption is 
that new players replicate the old, which is a much stronger condition.) 
     The reader conversant with probability theory might compare this with the conditions which are needed for, 
say, the central limit theorem or even for the law of large numbers: for the case of non-identically distributed 
random variables, these laws cannot be expected to hold unless some conditions are placed. For example, one 
frequently seen condition, dealing with the several summands, requires that the sum of the variances and the sum 
of their reciprocals both diverge. 
     In a similar way, our assumption 4 says, essentially, that no player is so rich, or so efficient, that he can 
handle more than a certain amount K of resources. One thing we want to rule out, for example, is successively 
larger and more efficient trios of players – with each trio playing a larger-scale version of the game in Example 
2. This condition is similar to the condition found in [Wooders, 1983, 1992] which she calls small group 
effectiveness. 
     On the other hand, assumption 5 states that the newly arriving players continue to contribute to the total sum 
of resources in a non-negligible amount – so that no player will, in the long run, have more than a negligible 
portion of any of the resources. Obviously, no convergence would be obtained if, for example, the new players 
were simply an infinity of dummies, with no endowment and no production functions. 
     Finally, assumption 6 in effect guarantees that the continuous differentiability of the several functions ui is (in 
some way) preserved in the limit. If this does not happen, then, effectively, differentiability is lost as n grows. 
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